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formation, Theoretical Computer Science 128 (1994) 99-125. 
The incorporation of a recovery algorithm into a program can be viewed as a program transforma- 
tion, converting the basic program into a fault-tolerant version. We present a framework in which 
such program transformations are accompanied by a corresponding specijcation transformation 
which obtains properties of the fault tolerant versions of the programs from properties of the basic 
programs. Compositionality is achieved when every property of the fault tolerant version can be 
obtained from a transformed property of the basic program. 
A verification method for proving the correctness of specification transformations is presented. 
This makes it possible to prove just once that a specification transformation corresponds to 
a program transformation, removing the need to prove separately the correctness of each trans- 
formed program. 
1. Introduction 
A fault tolerant program can be viewed as the result of superposing a recovery 
algorithm on a basic, non-fault tolerant program. Thus, adding a recovery algorithm 
can be seen as a program transformation, producing a program that can recover from 
faults in its execution environment. The combined execution of the basic program and 
the recovery algorithm ensures that the fault tolerant program achieves its goal 
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despite the occurrence of specified faults. Many different recovery algorithms have 
been devised [4,13] and these are often generic in the sense that they can be 
superposed over (or combined with) many different basic programs. 
Recovery algorithms may differ from one another in both the method used to 
achieve fault tolerance and in the kind of immunity they guarantee: for example, in 
their ability to handle multiple faults, the type of faults for which recovery is possible 
[26], and the amount of computation that is lost or required to be repeated during 
recovery [4]. A recovery algorithm can therefore be characterized by the kind of 
recovery that will take place after the occurrence of a fault and the kind of faults for 
which such immunity can be guaranteed. But it is important also to define the exact 
relation between the properties of a basic program and the properties of the fault 
tolerant program obtained after the superposition of a recovery algorithm. 
In this paper, we describe a framework for reasoning about distributed fault 
tolerant programs based on a transformational approach to representing faults and 
recovery algorithms. We show how the properties of recovery algorithms can be 
specified and how to obtain the relation between the behavior of a basic program and 
the version with recovery superposed. We define a criterion for correctness based on 
the use of a specification transformation, which transforms any property of the basic 
program into a property of its fault tolerant version (i.e. after superposing the recovery 
algorithm). This approach is especially beneficial when the behavior of the basic 
program is closely related to that of its fault tolerant version. For example, this is the 
case in fail-stop recovery [26], where the normal execution of the program temporar- 
ily stops when a failure occurs and recovery actions restore the program state using 
values stored in some nondestructive storage. 
This framework has an important practical advantage, as a relatively complete 
verification method is available to verify that a specification transformation corres- 
ponds to a program transformation. The specification transformation needs to be 
verified only once and can then be used to obtain properties of the transformed 
program from the properties of the basic program. 
The method is compositional: the specification transformation can be embedded in 
a compositional proof rule so that proving the properties of a fault-tolerant version of 
a basic program can be performed by proving properties of the basic program and 
then applying the specification transformation. For example, it allows deducing which 
classes of properties (e.g. mutual exclusion, eventual grant of a service) are preserved 
after the superposition. 
Specification transformations provide also a means of generically specifying fault 
tolerance in programs, rather than having to specify the behavior of each such 
transformed program separately. It may be observed that specification transforma- 
tions corresponding to program transformations can be used for other applications of 
program superposition, such as for deadlock detection [Z]. 
In Section 2, some preliminary notions concerning programs, temporal logic 
and interleaving semantics are reviewed. Specification transformations are intro- 
duced in Section 3. Examples of the specification of generic fault tolerance program 
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transformations are given in Section 4. In Section 5, a verification method for 
specification transformations is presented. Some particular difficulties of distributed 
fault tolerance are treated in Section 6, and Section 7 concludes with a discussion and 
suggestions for further research. 
2. Representing programs and their properties 
A program P is a triple (j, T, O), where j is a finite, ordered set of variables 
Yl?_YZ~~~~>Y,> T is a finite set of atomic operations, and 0 is a (first-order) initial 
condition. 
Each variable yi~j is defined over some domain. The Cartesian product S of these 
domains is called the state space of the program. A sfate s of a program is an 
assignment function from the set of variables to their appropriate domains. Let s /= cp 
denote that the (first-order) formula cp is satisfied by the state SEX In the sequel, 
first-order formulas will have free variables from j (e.g. q is actually q(j)), unless 
denoted otherwise. 
An operation TET is defined using transition formulas [17,21] that specify the 
relation between the old values j of the set of variables before executing the operation 
and the set of new values j’ after its execution. For an operation c( we write 
CP&~Y’)li,, - - where ~~(y, y’) is a formula that is interpreted over pairs of states 
(s, s’ ) I= p,(j, j’) such that the variables j are assigned values according to the state s, 
and j’ according to the state s’. The variables & are the only variables that may be 
changed by a (i.e. if x$&-,, then s’(x) = s(x)). It is assumed that there is no contradiction 
between U, and z, in the sense that all the variables that may change according to ,u, 
also appear in z,. Then, for any pair of states s, s’ such that s’ is obtained from s by 
executing c(, it holds that (s,s’)(=pJj,j’) A ~~ltY>zly:=yi. 
The initial condition 0 characterizes the initial states of the program, i.e. s l= 0 
iff the program can begin from the state s. The enabling condition of an operation 
is a first order formula over free variables from j that holds for the states in which 
that operation can be executed, i.e. enm=3j’p&,j’) where 3j’ is a shorthand for 
3y; 3y; . . . 
Representing a concurrent program by a set of operations is convenient both for 
verification and for defining different kinds of program transformations. “Actual” 
programs are written in a programming language which incorporates various specific 
features, such as the use of shared variables or synchronous or asynchronous com- 
munication. To give a uniform treatment of fault tolerance, we shall assume that such 
programs are translated into sets of operations and ignore the original language used. 
Examples of the translation of concurrent programs written in languages with shared 
variables and inter-process communication can be found in [20]. 
Definition 2.1. An execution sequence (or an interleaving sequence) of a program is an 
infinite sequence of states c = sosl s2,. . , satisfying the following conditions: 
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(1) s0 I= 0, where 0 is the initial condition, 
(2) for each i30, either’ Gi=gi+i, or there exists some TET such that 
(si,si+i)+pr(j,j’), and for each x$Z,, si(X)=si+i(X), and 
(3) sn/= A\,, Tl en, iff for each m > n, s, = s, (“basic liveness assumption”). 
The semantics of a program P is denoted by the function J&‘[PJ and is the set of 
interleaving sequences of P. 
Sometimes, an additional condition called “fairness” [S] further restricts the set of 
interleaving sequences that are considered to be executions of the program. Assume 
initially that there are no fairness restrictions; we consider later how fairness can affect 
fault tolerance. We begin by using linear temporal logic (LTL) [20] as the specifica- 
tion language over the execution sequences of the program. We shall later give an 
alternative interpretation of LTL over equivalence classes of interleaving sequences. 
In LTL, q cp means that cp holds in every future state, and cp U II/ that cp will continue 
to hold unless and up to the moment where $ holds in the future. cp%$ is stronger 
than cpU + and requires also that + will actually hold in the future. We allow 
quantification (i.e. 3.z q, Vz cp) over rigid variables, whose value is fixed over all states, 
and over.flexible variables, whose value can change from state to state. The formal 
definition of LTL can be found in the Appendix. 
A property can be seen either as a temporal formula cp, or as the set of sequences [VI 
that satisfy cp. Thus, a program cp has a property cp iff &Y[Pjj~[(pj. This is also 
denoted by P I= q 
Definition 2.2 (Manna and Pnueli [20]). An exact specijcution Qp of a program P is 
a formula that is satisfied exactly by the set of interleaving sequences of P, i.e. 
&Pll= [@,I. 
It is easy to see that for every formula, cp, PI= cp iff Qp -+ cp. 
Exact specifications can be used instead of the code of the program. In fact, in 
Lamport’s Temporal Logic of Actions (TLA) [17] the code of the program is 
described as its exact specification in a canonical form. Using the same notation for 
both programs and specification is appealing in the context of specification trans- 
formation. However, we will still make the more widely used traditional distinction 
between programs and specification. 
3. Formalizing recovery algorithms with specification transformations 
Consider a basic program that is designed to perform a computational task in 
a fault-free system. A generic recovery program is one which can be combined with 
1 “Stuttering” [15] is allowed in order to achieve compositionality 
A compositional framework for fault tolerance 103 
various basic programs to give programs which execute “correctly” when certain 
faults occur. Each recovery algorithm is intended to overcome some specific kinds of 
faults. Obviously, when faults do occur, the combined program will not behave 
exactly as the original basic program behaves when no faults occur. This section 
formalizes what it means for the combined program to be executed correctly under the 
faulty system. 
The executions of the combined program (in a fault-prone system) are related to 
the executions of the basic program (in a fault-free system) in a particular way that 
is guaranteed by the recovery algorithm. The relation can be viewed in terms of the 
transformation of the properties of the basic program to the properties of the 
combined program, when each program is executed under its specified environ- 
ment. This relation will be formalized as a specification transformation, which 
takes a specification of the basic program and produces a specification of the 
combined program. 
3.1. Program transformations and specification transformations 
The incorporation of a recovery algorithm into a basic program is a superposition 
which takes the union of the operations of the two programs and strengthens the 
enabledness conditions of some selected operations of the basic program. Various 
other forms of superpositions (also called super-imposition) have been discussed, e.g., 
in [3,6]. In this way, operations that come from the superposed program are 
executable in the combined program, and further the superposed program controls 
the execution of the operations that come from the basic program. The superposition 
transformation enlarges the original state space S to a related space s^ which is the 
Cartesian product of more domains than are included in S. 
Superposition is an example of a program transformation. A program transforma- 
tion Y is a function Y: P H P, where P is a domain of programs (e.g. programs 
written in a certain language, or programs given as sets of operations that satisfy 
certain syntactical conditions). 
Definition 3.1. A program transformation ~9 is monotonic if for each pair of programs 
P1,P2~P, if A[P,jcA[P,j then .,h’[F(P,)jcA[Y(P2)j. 
Not every program transformation is monotonic. For example, consider the follow- 
ing program transformation Y( ({x,y}, T, O))= ({x,y}, Tu {y: [y’=y+ l](_~}, 0). 
Given Pi=({x,y}, (K [y=O A x’=~+l]~~~},x=O A y=O), and P2=({x,y}, (/I: 
[x’=x+ I]{& x=0 A y=O); it is evident that ~&‘[Pij =A [PJ and thus also that 
A’[rP,-jzA[PJJ. H owever, A’[F(P,)J c Jt’[.F(P,)J The reason is that en3=y=0, 
while enp%T. This is not reflected in the semantics of PI and P2 as y is unchanged 
during any execution of these programs. However, when the operation y is added, the 
value of y can change at some point in the execution of PI, preventing CI from being 
further executed, while in P,p can still occur. 
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Fig. 1. .S corresponds to .T‘. 
A specification transformation F is a function 9: 2’ N 2, where 9’ is the set of 
formulas in some specification language such as LTL. 
Definition 3.2. A specification transformation B corresponds to 
formation Y if it satisfies the condition that for each program 
5(P)(=5(~) (see Fig. 1). 
a program trans- 
P, if P (= p, then 
Specification transformations can be used to verify properties of the transformed 
program Y(P), from verified properties of the program P. Proving S(P) k II/ is then 
reduced to proving a property of P, applying the specification transformation and 
doing some pure LTL verification. There is no need to use the actual code of *Y(P) in 
the verification. The proof uses the following proof rule: 
Ideally, the transformation should make it possible to derive logically every prop- 
erty of the transformed program from the basic program (cf. Zwiers’ compositional 
completeness [27]). That is, the proof rule (1) needs to be applicable to every formula 
$ that holds in F(P). The following (relative) completeness definition applies to 
transformations in which every property of the transformed program can be proved 
from the basic program and the transformation. This completeness is relative to the 
ability of the temporal language used here to formulate such an appropriate formula 
C,O and proving temporal properties of programs (as needed in premise 1, P I= q), and 
the ability to prove LTL tautologies, (as required in premise 2, 9((p) + $). 
Definition 3.3. A specification transformation 8 is said to be compositional complete 
with respect to a program transformation Y if for every program P and every 
formula $ such that F(P)(=$ there exists a formula cp such that Pl==cp and 
s(o)-,+. 
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The following two lemmas show that compositional completeness is highly depend- 
ent upon the monotonicity of the program transformation. 
Lemma 3.4. If a specification transformation F that corresponds to a program trans- 
.formation F is nonmonotonic, then 9 cannot be compositional complete w.r.t. F. 
Proof. Let Y be a nonmonotonic program transformation. Then, there exists a pair 
of programs PI and P2 with A!‘[P1 JJ E ~2’ [P2j such that ~[[~(P,)] $2 [JH[F(P~)]. 
Let 9 be a specification transformation that corresponds to Y. Let $2 be an exact 
specification of F(P,). Assume compositional completeness of 9 w.r.t. f-. Then, 
there exists a property cp of P2 such that g(cp) --f ti2. Since & [PI 1 c ~2’ [P, Jj, it is also 
the case that PI + cp. 
Since F corresponds to 9, F(P,)+9((p). From the fact that $z is an exact 
specification of Y(P,), ti2 -+9(q) and, therefore, P(q)++rj2, i.e. F(rp) is also an exact 
specification of F(P,). However, since A?‘[~(P,)~ $A@‘[F(P~)]=[[$~J’, then 
Y(P,)k$, and, thus, F(P,)&F(q), which contradicts the fact that 9 corresponds 
to Y. 0 
Definition 3.5. A specification transformation B is exact w.r.t. a program transforma- 
tion F if for each property cp, C?(V) is a formula that is satisfied exactly by the 
execution sequences u {JZ [F(P)] IAhPn c [rcpj }. 
The converse of Lemma 3.4 depends on the expressiveness of the specification 
language used as stated concisely in the following lemma. 
Lemma 3.6. Compositional completeness can be achieved for monotonic program trans- 
formations, given a specification language that is expressive enough to formulate exact 
specification transformations. 
Proof. Let cp be an exact specification of a given program PI. Then &(cp) is satisfied 
exactly by the sequences E = u {J&‘~F(P)] I_A?[P]+] }. Since Iqj =A’[P& it 
holds that E = IJ {A’[F(P)] 1 A”[P] CA [P,] }. Because of monotonicity, 
E = A’[Y(P,)], which are exactly the sequences of the transformed version F(P,) of 
the program PI. Thus, d transfers an exact specification of a program PI to an exact 
specification of F(P,). For proving that F(P,) I= $, it is always possible to formulate 
an exact specification ye of PI, and apply F on r] to obtain a formula that is an exact 
specification of F(Pl) and, this implies I/I, as required in Definition 3.3. 0 
3.2. Specification transformation for fault tolerance 
To represent failure and recovery, superposition can be done in two stages [19] (see 
Fig. 2). 
(1) Superposing the recovery algorithm. First the recovery algorithm, represented by 
a set of operations, is superposed on the basic program. 
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Basic Program 
I 
Recovery algorithm I 
;________________________; 
I 
I Fault representation 
I 
Fig. 2. The two stages of superposition. 
(2) Superposing thefailure mechanism. As the second step, a “fault program”, which 
represents faults by a set of operations, is superposed on the program obtained in the 
first step. 
This may seem surprising at first: a recovery algorithm is normally seen as 
a procedure which is intended to be superposed on a program, but faults are not 
represented as pieces of code. However, if faults are considered as events that 
“interfere” with the execution of a program [7] they can be represented by a set of 
operations and this is a convenient way to avoid the need to deal with faults at the 
semantic level (see [ 191 for a detailed discussion). By encoding faults as occurrences of 
specially constructed operations, we have the flexibility of using a single semantics for 
various different types of faults, as well as for fault-free executions, rather than dealing 
with a specialized semantics for each kind of fault. 
Let the basic program be denoted by P. Let the superposition of a 
recovery algorithm on a basic program P give R =Fl(P) and let the super- 
position of the failure mechanism on R give F2(R). Then the entire transformation 
is F(P)=F2(Fl(P)). In the rest of this paper, we apply both transformations, 
namely, the recovery algorithm and the failure mechanism, in this order, on basic 
programs. 
The first step in formalizing a recovery algorithm is to specify those of its properties 
that are independent of the basic program: the recovery operations will have these 
properties regardless of the basic program to which they are superposed. Such 
properties may include, for example, the guarantee that recovery will be eventually 
completed (perhaps conditional on the type and frequency of the faults), the non- 
blocking of the basic program by the addition of the recovery actions, the ability to 
overcome multiple faults, and other such fixed properties. It may also be asserted that 
recovery will occur within a bounded time (e.g. using a real time temporal logic such 
as [lo]). We call such properties the $xed part of the specification. The fixed part 
defines the responsiveness of the recovery algorithm to the occurrence of failures. It 
does not describe the effect of recovery on the program, but rather the behavior of the 
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recovery algorithm itself when superposed on a basic program. This includes recovery 
actions (such as maintaining consistent checkpoints by taking periodic snapshots) 
that are executed when no failure occurs in order to achieve fault tolerance. 
The second part of the formalization is a transformation 9 which converts properties 
of the basic program into properties of the fault-tolerant version. Given a basic program 
P which satisfies a certain property, applying the transformation Y to P results in 
a program which satisfies a new specification. The transformation B is applied to 
specijications, o that for each cp satisfied by P, 9(cp) is a specification of F(P) (i.e. 
g corresponds to 5). The fixed part of the specification may be embedded as 
a constant part of every formula obtained from the specification transformation. 
Different behaviors can be guaranteed for different fault situations. For example, 
superposition of a particular recovery algorithm on a basic program might preserve 
some properties when assumptions are made to limit the repetitive occurrence of 
faults. If, however, faults do occur during recovery, some weaker properties of the 
basic algorithm are preserved. In general, the effect of the transformation can be 
conditioned by the nature and the frequency of occurrence of faults. For example, 
some liveness properties may be maintained whenever only a finite number of faults 
occur, but not otherwise. 
3.3. Concealment 
In many cases, the internal details of the recovery algorithm are of less interest han 
the effect of the recovery on the basic program, so it would be useful to suppress these 
details. Hiding operations and program variables are essential to specification 
methods such as process algebras or refinement mappings. In temporal ogic, this can 
be defined using a state function 0 which filters out irrelevant parts of the state, e.g. by 
removing references to variables that are not of interest. Then a specification can be 
given with respect o the filtered state space, rather than the original state space. But 
for more complex kinds of program transformations, the filtering may need to be 
more complicated, e.g. filtering out the sending and receiving of control messages that 
are needed for the recovery but not for the basic program. 
The state function 0 can be generalized in the obvious way to a function on 
sequences of states and on sets of sequences. If A? [Pa is the semantic representation of 
program P as a set of interleaving sequences, then O(A[PJJ) represents the result of 
applying the mapping 0 to conceal unwanted detail. The function 0 can be chosen 
appropriately to reveal all the information about failure and recovery, or some or 
none of this information. Note that it is possible that a program transformation is not 
monotonic but becomes monotonic under a given concealment. 
The exact internal details of the recovery part of the combined program are also not 
of great interest and can thus be ignored in favor of observing only the effect of 
superposition on the basic program. Thus, compositional completeness can instead be 
weakened, and defined with respect o the concealment of the superposed program, i.e. 
by replacing F(P) with @(F(P)) in Definition 3.3. 
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4. Examples of specification transformations 
A typical recovery algorithm restores a program to a consistent state after a fault 
has occurred so that its execution can be resumed. A common way to achieve this is to 
preserve a checkpoint or a snapshot, which is a global state of the basic program P to 
which execution can be restored upon recovery. However, different recovery algo- 
rithms will have different ways of establishing the relation between this global state 
and the state in which the failure occurred. Some possible schemes are to permit 
recovery to one of the following states: 
(1) a state in the past of the current interleaving sequence, 
(2) a state in a possible future of the last global state of the system before the most 
recent failure occurred. 
As will be shown in Section 6, in distributed programs it is sometimes necessary to 
weaken the conditions for a snapshot so that it can be taken efficiently. This will 
require special treatment, and will not correspond directly to either of the two cases 
mentioned above. 
4.1. Backward recovery 
Backward recovery allows a program suffering a failure to resume execution from 
a previously saved checkpoint. After recovery, a nondeterministic program will not 
necessarily repeat its previous execution in the interval between the time the check- 
point was established and the time the failure occurred. We shall illustrate the use of 
specification transformations for backward recovery using the example of a program 
subject to fail-stop faults during its execution. 
First, the operations of the basic program are augmented by superposing an 
interrupt mechanism: the enabling conditions of both sets of operations (of the basic 
program and the interrupt mechanism) are strengthened by testing the value of the 
boolean variable main. Each enabling condition en, of a basic program operation r is 
strengthened to en, A main which requires now main also to be T, corresponding to 
the case where there is no interrupt. On the occurrence of an interrupt, main is set to 
F to disable the basic program operations and enable the interrupt operations. When 
interrupt processing is over, main is reset to T. Thus the addition of such an interrupt 
mechanism fits in well with the superposition framework. 
Assume that during the normal execution of the program a timer interrupt period- 
ically initiates the saving of consistent states of the program in a nonvolatile, nondes- 
tructive stable memory.2 On the occurrence of a fail-stop fault [26], the contents of the 
main memory are assumed to be destroyed, and an interrupt triggers the execution of 
a failure interrupt handler. 
*In a distributed system this may be expensive to implement and thus an alternative model of 
computation is defined in Section 6. 
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Consider the following recovery algorithm. The stable memory is partitioned into 
two segments, each having a dedicated area for every program variable. When a new 
snapshot is to be taken, each variable x is saved in either area 1 or area 2. A snapshot 
is taken when an interrupt handler is triggered by a periodic timer. The handler stores 
the current contents of the entire program memory alternatively in area 1 or area 2, 
according to the value of a special variable var_set, which also resides in stable 
memory. The value in this variable is altered only after the entire contents of memory 
have been saved, so that a failure which occurs while the memory is being saved does 
not affect the last complete saved copy. Executing the transformed program begins 
after initializing Area 1 to hold a copy of main memory’s initial values and setting 
var_set to 1. 
Timer interrupt handler Failure interrupt handler 
on timer-interrupt do 
disable timer-interrupt; 
if var_set = 2 then 
for each variable x do 
write x to area 1; 
varset: = 1; 
else 
on failure-interrupt do 
disable timer-interrupt; 
if var_set = 1 then 
for each variable x do 
read x from area 1; 
else 
for each variable x do 












% c = T 
% c=T 
for each variable x do 
read x from area 2; 
enable timer-interrupt; 
end handler; 








The interrupt handler for a failure disallows timer interrupts (so there is no saving of 
memory when a failure occurs) and copies back the contents of the last correctly saved 
segment of stable memory to the main memory. Note that a failure can occur during the 
execution of the timer interrupt handler, or while recovering from a previous failure. 
The transformation that combines the interrupt handlers with basic program, and takes 
care of an appropriate initialization, can be shown to be monotonic. 
We define the following special state predicates. The specification (transformation) 
of the fault-tolerant version of the program will conceal the internal variables of the 
interrupt handlers and the interrupt timer, revealing only the values of these predi- 
cates and the basic program variables. 
f (&~lt): A fault occurs in this state (a single fault may hold through multiple 
states). 
r (recooery): Recovery has begun by the occurrence of a fault, but has not yet been 
completed. 
s (snapshot): States in which a snapshot is taken. 
c (checkpoint): A new checkpoint is established just after a snapshot was success- 
fully taken. This predicate holds when a new snapshot is available and the execution 
of the basic computation is just about to resume. 
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Fig. 3. A noninstantaneous recovery 
w (wasted): A fault will occur before the next checkpoint is reached and hence the 
present state of the computation will be wasted. Suffixes of an execution sequence 
from some w-state satisfy the temporal property 1~ A ((~c)%kr) and thus w can be 
seen as a shorthand for this formula. 
Let a state in which the boolean state function x holds be called an x-state and 
a finite sequence of x-states be called an x-interval. 
The transitions between states with different values of the state functions are shown 
in Fig. 3. In each state, only state predicates with value T are listed; e.g. the state ‘f, Y” 
represents 1 w A.~A --I c A r A 1 s. The symbol E represents a state in which all the 
above predicates are F. Each node has a self-loop (hence, it is not possible to 
distinguish stuttering). In addition, no infinite sequence of states in any execution 
corresponds to an infinite path of dashed arrows (e.g. it is not possible that from some 
point in the computation ‘s, w‘ will hold forever). Figure 3 distinguishes the following 
combinations of state functions, abbreviated as x1,. . . ,x7: 








To present the fixed part of the specification of the recovery algorithm, i.e. the 
conditions of Fig. 3, let x,xi,yi, . . . represent a boolean combination of all the above 
State predicates (e.g. xj =-I w A 1.f A c A 1 r A 1 s). 
A typical execution of the original program and of the fault-tolerant transformed 
program are depicted in Fig. 4. This figure illustrates the correspondence between 
execution sequences of both programs. For each sequence in the basic program, there 
is a sequence in the transformed program that simulates its &-intervals (corresponding 
intervals are shown with the same particular shading). Conversely, for every sequence 
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Basic program execution 
Fault tolerant program execution 
Fig. 4. A typical execution of the transformed program. 
of the transformed program there exists an execution sequence of the basic program in 
which everything but the s-intervals are removed. Consider the following formulas: 
l A state in which x holds can be changed into a state in which one of y,,y,, . . . ,yn, 
hold: 0(X+(X U V,!‘= ryi)). 
a From no point in the computation will all states satisfy one of yl,y2, . . . ,y,: 
0 01 VI!= ryi. 
Then, the conditions imposed on the state predicates in Fig. 3 can be written as 
FIXED=oOlxI A q O1x2 A •OTX~ 
0(X1-*(x1 UX,)) A 4X2 +(X2uXd) A 
dXs-‘(Xsu(X~ “X4))) A q (X~-‘(X~u(X~ “XT))) A 
q (Xs --*(X5 u Xd) A q (X6 -+(X6 u (XI ” X5))) A 
4X7-+(X, u X5)). 
The second part of the transformation, defined below recursively as l(cp, 1 Y A 1 w), 
reflects the fact that after taking away the intervals in which Y or w hold (as implied 
from FIXED, an&state is also an r-state, and thus lfis not mentioned explicitly) the 
part of the execution that remains behaves like the basic program with the addition of 
checkpointing actions (the snapshot states, namely s v c-states, behave like stuttering 
states when their internal variables are concealed). The effect of the internal computa- 
tion in taking and restoring checkpoints is easily hidden by concealing the additional 
variables in the transformed specification. 
The transformation is therefore 
F(q) = FIXED A /(cp, 1 Y A 1 w), 
where 1(~, q) is defined inductively as 
l I(cp, V) = (1 ?j U (‘I A cp)), where 9 is a classical (nontemporal) formula, 
l 40 qoR, ‘I) = q ~(cP, rl), l(@W, il) = Qcp, ~)@‘1(1(/, v)
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l hv v $, d = Ucp, r) v WY ~1, 4cp A $, v) = Qrp, d A W, ~1, and 
l negations are pushed inwards to stand adjacent to classical subformulas. 
This transformation first pushes the negation symbols inside the formula as much 
as possible. This can be done using known LTL equivalences (e.g. 1 0 cp = 01 cp) and 
results in a formula in which negation symbols do not precede any temporal subfor- 
mula. Then each classical (nontemporal) formula cp is replaced by (1 r) U (q A cp)), 
which means that a state satisfying cp can be delayed by the “bad” (no progress) states 
(7 u) = Y v w-states. 
It is possible to give a stronger transformation $ (i.e. & returns a stronger property 
than 9 when given the same property of the original program) at the expense of some 
elegance. Recall that more information is known about the w-intervals than is 
revealed in the transformation: any w-interval, together with all the previous 
1 r A 1 w-intervals, forms a prefix of a legal interleaving sequence of the basic 
program. Thus, each w-interval should be separately distinguished while the preced- 
ing w-intervals are ignored. 
Let d be a new boolean state function which changes at most once in each execution 
sequence (i.e. o(d+od)) with the change being synchronized with a change of r from 
F to T. This is described using the predicate synch(d, r)= q ((1 d@d)-+ 
(-I d%((l d A 1 r)%(d A r)))). The w-interval which comes immediately before the 
change of A, is the distinguished interval and quantifying universally over d selects each 
such possible interval. Thus, the resultant transformation is 
@((cp)=Vd(FIXED A synch(d,r) A q (d+od) A I^(cp,w,r,d)), (2) 
where the transformation i(qD,q1,y2,u3) is similar to I(Q,~), except for the basic 
case (where cp is a classical formula) which is now l(cp, yll, Y/~, q3)=q3 v 
((ql A ~(1 q2Qr/3))@cp). Note that when ql, q2 and q3 are instantiated to w, r and d, 
respectively, the expression q1 A 1 (1~7~~4Yn~) holds in any w-interval that is not the 
distinguished w-interval. For the distinguished interval, this expression does not hold 
and, thus, cp must hold immediately. For yet a stronger transformation, cp can be 
replaced in the above formula for f((p,ql, y2, q3) by the expression 
(cp A (al-+(1 q2uliq3))), which holds in cp states that are either not in a 1 w-interval, 
or in the distinguished w-interval. 
Now, consider some properties that the original program P might be required to 
satisfy: the first is responsiveness to requests, i.e. that when a request for some service 
is issued, the appropriate service is eventually granted. This can be written in LTL, 
using appropriate predicates request and service as 
0 (request- 0 service). 
The second property is mutual exclusion, i.e. that the program does not enter two 
critical sections CS, and CS2 simultaneously: 
07 (in(CS,) A in(CS2)). 
A compositional framework for fault tolerance 113 
Then, under the above program transformation #-, these properties cannot be 
guaranteed. However, some weaker properties, related to them can be achieved: in the 
presence of a finite number of failures, any request is serviced. 
0 ((request A 0 0 if) -+ 0 service). 
When a failure or recovery are not active (since failures are detected immediately 
here, we may refer to recovery states, which include the failure states), mutual 
exclusion between CS, and CS2 is achieved (however, because of failure, the program 
counters can be corrupted so that mutual exclusion is violated). 
q (-lr+l(in(CS~)A in(CS,))). 
These properties can be formally proved by using the formula transformation 
9 and the proof rule (1) in Section 3.1. 
In some other cases, the environment may impose restrictions over the kind of 
recovery that is possible. Backward recovery assumes that the program is a closed 
system [iSI and that the recovery algorithm has the ability to control all parts 
of the system. But for program recovery in an open system, special care must be 
taken since the environment now includes other processes that might not be affected 
by the faults or the recovery algorithm (of course, these processes may be affected by 
their own faults). In this case, inputs from the environment must be stored in 
nonvolatile memory to be used upon recovery and outputs to the environment hat 
have been sent once must be blocked after recovery until real progress is being 
made [ll]. 
Thus, in open systems the inputs and outputs (channels) must appear explicitly in 
the abstract representation of the basic program and, after recovery, the computation 
must not return immediately to its original mode, but pass through a temporary 
“silent” mode in which no actual input and output occur. This can be represented in 
the transformation using another boolean state function which identifies when such 
an interval occurs, and a state mapping which relates the states during this period to 
the original state when normal execution is in progress (noting the difference in the 
values of the input and output channels). 
4.2. Forward recovery 
Forward recovery, in which the system recovers from a fault by restarting the 
execution from a possible future global state, is sometimes essential to overcome the 
effects of faults, particularly in real-time systems. Here, a part of the computation is 
not repeated or redone, as in backward recovery, but is skipped when a fault occurs, 
i.e. the computation reaches a point at which a failure occurs and then, skipping up to 
some future state, it resumes an execution which is consistent with its most recent 
initial execution segment. 
Let p be a boolean variable which is T exactly when recovery from the last fault has 
not yet been completed (including states in which a fault has occurred and recovery 
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has not yet started) and F otherwise. For the moment, ignore the details of 
the recovery method, i.e. what happens between the occurrence of a fault and 
the resumption of the basic program from a future state. Then the forward 
recovery transformation g’ is defined as FIXED’ A q l’(cp, 1 p) where FIXED’ 
is the fixed property of the recovery algorithm and 1’ is defined induct- 
ively as 
l I’(cp, q)=l q -+(p, where cp is a classical (nontemporal) formula, 
l l’(ncp, 4) = q l’(cp, 4), l’(cpW, 4) = I’(% qW’($, 4) 
l l’(V’zcp, 4)=\Jz l’(cp,q), 1’(3zG%q)=3z I’(&& 
l [‘(cp v $, 4) = ~‘(cP, 4) v l’($, q), l’(rp A $, 4) = ~‘(cP, 4) A I’($, q), and 
l negations are pushed inwards to stand adjacent to classical subformulas. 
That is, an execution G of the transformed program Y(P) resembles an execution B’ 
of P, except that arbitrary intervals of cr’ are replaced by p-intervals (not necessarily of 
the same length). The p-intervals correspond to the states in which a fault occurs and 
the program then recovers. Notice that this transformation is very similar to the 
previous one in the sense that when negations are pushed inside it preserves the 
structure (e.g. the boolean operators, quantifiers and modals) of the transformed 
formula. 
5. Proving the correctness of specification transformations 
Verifying that a given program transformation corresponds to some specific- 
ation transformation means that a whole class of properties is being verified at 
the same time, and with respect to a class of programs. Thus, a higher order logic 
verification is needed. The verification of program transformations that preserve 
program semantics was studied by Huet and Lang [9]. They used a second order 
language to verify program transformations that are used for code optimization 
of sequential programs. Our notion of correctness is more general as the trans- 
formations under discussion are not restricted to preserve the semantics of the 
transformed programs. 
Since a recovery algorithm can be applied to an entire class of programs, we use 
a suitable representation of an uninterpreted basic program B which can later be 
replaced by a concrete program. The uninterpreted representation is a program 
written using some uninterpreted relation and function symbols. A concrete program 
is obtained from the uninterpreted representation by instantiating the uninterpreted 
symbols. 
An uninterpreted program may use a single variable x to represent its entire state by 
an encoding of its variables. But many other representations of uninterpreted pro- 
grams are possible. (Recovery algorithms that are more involved than the simple 
examples used here may need more complicated representation: see [24] for another 
way to represent uninterpreted programs.) Each atomic program operation c( can then 
be written using the transition formula pL,(x,x’) (with Z;= {x)) and, because of the 
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uniformity of the operations, we use a single operation to represent the entire 
program3 
( (x=x’)A Alen, v VpN(x,x’). UET > CtGT 
Thus, a noninterpreted program can be represented by a single operation 
[~(x,x’)]~~,. Let O(x) be a predicate that is true over the x’s that are initial values of 
the basic program. Then an exact specification of the program (with rigid variable y) is 
@B=@(x) A q 3y(x=y%~(y,x)). (3) 
This formula is only partially interpreted, as p and 0 are not given. When 
a concrete program P is given, the uninterpreted relation and function symbols of 
B are instantiated to the given relation and functions of P. At the same time, the 
occurrences of symbols in QB can be instantiated similarly to form an exact specifica- 
tion QP of P. 
The representation of uninterpreted programs must be chosen appropriately to 
facilitate the application of the program transformation. Let B be an uninterpreted 
program. Apply Y on B such that Y(B) is an uninterpreted fault tolerant program (or 
notfully interpreted, as at least the relation and function symbols concerned with the 
recovery algorithm and fault mechanism representation are given). Let Yg be an exact 
specification of Y(B). When instantiating B to a concrete P, the same instantiation to 
the occurrences of these relation and function symbols in YB will form an exact 
specification YP of S(P). 
The relation between formulas, transformed programs and specification trans- 
formations is illustrated in Fig. 5. As we have pointed out, a specification transforma- 
tion is a formula of a higher-order logic since treating temporal formulas as objects 
requires a higher-order logic. With this in mind, the following lemma can be proved 
directly from Definitions 3.2 and 3.5. 
Lemma 5.1. Zf 8 is an exact specijication transformation w.r.t. a program transforma- 
tion F-, and 9 is another specification transformation, then 9 corresponds to F ifffor 
each LTL formula cp, 6((p)-+F(cp). 
We now describe a relatively complete proof method for specification transforma- 
tions. In order to verify that 9 corresponds to Y, 
1. formulate 6, an exact specification transformation w.r.t. Y-, and 
2. prove that for each formula cp, 6((p)+P(cp). 
The completeness of this method (this is a different completeness concept from the one 
defined in 3.3) is w.r.t. the expressiveness of the language used to formulate &(cp) in 1, 
and the ability to prove the implication in 2. 
3This single operation allows further simplification of the exact specification of the program by 
representing program termination as infinite stuttering. 
116 D. Peled, M. Joseph 
AlI @@ I&(9)1 Ij-(P’)l 
Fig. 5. Exact and correct specification transformation. 
Under the above (example of) abstract representation, there are only two relation 
symbols p and 0. Then, an exact specification transformation w.r.t. Y can be 
formulated by 
where, as before, QB and Yg are the exact specifications of the uninterpreted programs 
B and of Y(B), respectively (the generality of the uninterpreted relations and functions 
can be limited by adding some appropriate conjunct). The assertion [QBJ E 1~4 is 
a high-order formula that asserts that any sequence satisfying QB also satisfies cp, i.e. 
that cp is a consequence of QB. Formula (4) should be read as follows: an interleaving 
sequence (T satisfies 8(q) iff there exists a program P (i.e. an instantiation of the 
relation symbols p and 0) that satisfies cp, such that G is an execution of Y-(.9). That is, 
the formula &(cp) is satisfied exactly by execution sequences of programs obtained by 
the transformation F from programs satisfying cp. 
5.1. An example 
Consider a simple recovery algorithm which is a simplified version of the algorithm 
in Section 4.1. This algorithm occasionally stops the basic computation, records the 
global state, and then allows the basic computation to continue. On the occurrence of 
a failure, the program is rolled back to the last saved state. It is assumed that taking 
snapshots and recovering are instantaneous. 
We use the previous boolean state functions r, s and w (of states of the transformed 
program) when expressing the transformations: 
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r (uficted): A fault has occurred and recovery from it has not yet completed. Thus, 
part or all of the global state may be corrupted. 
s (snapshot): A snapshot is taken of the state space. The basic program state is not 
changed during the recording of its state space. 
w (wasted): The present state of the computation does not correspond to effective 
progress of the basic computation, because the next fault will occur before the next 
checkpoint is reached (and rolling back to the last saved checkpoint will undo this 
part of the computation). Again, w can be seen as a shorthand for the formula 
7 r A ((7 s)%r). 
The possible transitions between these states are described in Fig. 6. One can easily 
formulate the fixed part of the specification transformation, as in Section 4.1. 
Similar to the example in Section 4.1, the second part of the transformation, defined 
recursively as 1(q,l w A 1 Y), must reflect the fact that after taking away the intervals 
in which w holds, the part of the execution that remains behaves like the basic 
program (with the addition of checkpointing operations, which uses additional 
variables that are concealed). With this simplified transformation, no claim is made 
about the basic program’s behavior during the w v r-intervals. This corresponds to 
the assumption that the variables of the original program are arbitrarily corrupted. As 
in Section 4.1, it is possible to distinguish between w-states, in which the system 
performs as intended in the basic program and r-states, in which the predicted fault 
has occurred. We will show here only how to verify the simple case where all the 
w-states are treated as “bad” states, about which the only interesting information is 
that they do not contribute anything to the computation. 
Let B be an uninterpreted representation of the basic program using a single 
variable (as in the previous subsection), a single operation q_,: [~(x,x’)]~, and let the 
initial value of x satisfy O(x). Consider a transformation of B that adds to the program 
the following operations to represent taking snapshots, faults and recovery: 
Z,& [l Y A p(x, x’) A 1 s’],,,. The modified original operation is not enabled when 
recovery from the most recent fault has not yet occurred. The snapshot flag is reset for 
the case where a snapshot has just been taken. 
r,,,p: [l s A 1 r A save’=x A s’]~~~~,~. The current value of x is copied into the 
variable save in a nondestructive memory. 
T~-aulr: cr’ A 1 s’],,x,s. The variable Y is T exactly when a fault has occurred. In 
addition, the variable x can take any value (i.e. be arbitrarily corrupted) when a fault 
occurs. 
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Fig. 7. A typical execution of the transformed program 
t [r A x’=saue A 7 r’ A i s’],,,,,. recover The value of x is restored using the last 
value stored in save. 
The initial condition is -I r A (saue=x) A O(x). 
The atomic operation ~~~~~ takes a global snapshot of the entire program 
state (in practice, it should be replaced by several operations that perform this 
task). 
We introduce a new temporal modal ((q)) (actually, a family of modals) for 
each temporal formula 11, such that ((lf>>cp is true iff the sequence obtained by 
keeping only the states that satisfy v also satisfies cp (or if it is finite, is a prefix 
of a sequence that satisfies cp). A formal definition of this modal appears in the 
Appendix. 
It can be proved using temporal logic verification methods [20] that for this 
program, the following formula K (with y a rigid variable) holds for F(B): 
K=Wu(lWA@(X))AO~y((WU(lWAX=y))~(WU(lWAj.L(y,X)))). 
Hence, YB-+~ holds. Using the axioms of ((q)) below and other linear temporal 
logic axioms, it is possible to deduce that 
‘y~-‘<lW>(@(x) A •3Y(X=Y’~ldY,X))). (5) 
Now consider the following higher-order deduction for the correctness of the 
follows directly from (5). 
formulated in (4) 
from 1 and 2. 
from 3. 
from 4 (p and 0 do not 
occur free in cp). 
from 5. 
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The next step is to get rid of the new modal ((y>> so that S(q) can be written in an 
equivalent form using only the traditional modal operators. The following axioms of 
((~1 enable this translation: 
l (((r>>q)++(l ye U (II A q)), when 9 is a classical (nontemporal) formula. 
l (~~>~cp)++(~~vl>~), (((vl))(~~~))tt((((vl))cp)~(((r))rl/)). 
l (<r>>vzrp)-(~‘z(o7>>)? (Cr>3z(P)+Wll>cp). 
l (G>(cp ” $))-((<r>cp) ” (G/W)). 
These axioms reflect the fact that ((q)) distributes with every other modal and 
connective except negation. The transformation I(cp, q), given in Section 4.1 is easily 
obtained from these axioms. 
Note that the exact transformation 6(q) is useful only for proving the formula 
transformation 9(q) but not as a formula transformation in itself. Besides being 
a higher-order temporal formula, its component subformula Yg is an exact specifica- 
tion of the transformed program, where the details of the recovery mechanism are 
explicitly expressed (although the details of the basic program are kept abstract). This 
results in a rather complicated and detailed transformation. Furthermore, &(q) does 
not provide a clear correspondence between the transformed formula and the resulted 
formula. 
Returning to the resultant specification transformation, the new boolean state 
predicates (e.g. w and r that appear in the transformations in Section 4.1) correspond 
to auxiliary variables in the program. Although for simplicity they were used in this 
example directly as boolean program variables, they are not in general part of the 
recovery program. Some (like r) are simple history variables, while others (in particu- 
lar w) are (generalized) prophecy variables [l]. Some variables can have complicated 
roles, like the variable d of Section 4.1, which should be added to the program as an 
auxiliary variable to satisfy particular conditions. 
6. Generalizing distributed recovery 
6.1. Extending the semantic and syntactic formalism 
Representing executions of distributed programs as interleaving sequences does not 
always lend itself to a simple specification transformation: consider an interleaving 
sequence D of the transformed program in which a snapshot is taken. It is often the 
case that the snapshot does not represent any state that occurs in 0, but a state that 
could have occurred in a sequence which is related to c in some sense. This property of 
snapshot algorithms stems from the fact that maintaining a snapshot that indeed 
occurs in the same sequence is costly, as it requires all the processes of the program to 
be stopped before the snapshot is taken. 
Recovery schemes are often based on establishing recovery points that do not 
necessarily belong to the same interleaving sequence, but merely to some equivalent 
sequence or, equivalently, a global state which is a “slice” of a partial order execution 
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Partial Order Execution 
Linearizations 
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Fig. 8. A partial order executions and its linearizations 
[S]. For this reason, we extend the semantics by defining equivalence classes of 
interleaving sequences. Partial order executions and their alternative representation 
by sets of linearizations or interleaving sequences are described in [16]. 
Figure 8 depicts the relation between a partial order execution, interleaving seman- 
tics and global snapshots. A partial order execution consists of partially ordered set of 
occurrences of operations. The occurrences of operations of the same process are 
totally ordered (there are processes PI, . , P4 in Fig. 8) and the event of sending 
a message precedes the event of receiving the same message. To each such execution 
there exists a set of linearizations, or completion of the partial order to total orders 
that form interleaving sequences of this execution. A snapshot of a distributed 
program is a collection of local states, one for each process. This collection satisfies 
that there are no messages that are sent from one process Pi after (according to the 
partial order) its local state was recorded into the snapshot, and received by a process 
Pj before the local state of Pj is recorded. Among the set of linearizations that 
correspond to each such partial order execution, there exists at least one that has 
a global state that agrees (i.e. has the same value assigned to all the variables) with the 
snapshot recorded [ 121. 
As an alternative semantics for partial order execution, we construct equivalence 
classes of interleaving sequences that correspond directly to the linearizations of such 
partial orders. This semantics is based on infinite traces [ 141, a generalization of finite 
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traces [223. Each equivalence class corresponds to one partial order execution. 
A partial order execution is then an intersection of the total orders between occur- 
rence of operations in such an equivalence class. 
The operations are now assumed to be deterministic in the sense that for any state 
SES and operation CYE T, s can have at most a single successor generated by executing 
a. An interleaving sequence will also be represented as a pair CJ = (so, v), where so is 
the first (initial) state of the sequence, and v is a sequence of operations clocll CI~ . . such 
that ai is the operation that transforms i to si+ 1. We add a special no_op symbol that 
generates tuttering, which is independent of any other operation. 
Let I E T x T be a symmetric and irreflexive relation between operations called an 
independence relation [22], satisfying the properties: (1) each pair of operations 
(zl, r&l is commutative, when treated as global state transformers, and (2) the 
execution of r1 cannot enable, or disable t2, and vice versa [14]. If (T~,z~)EI, we say 
that rl and z2 are independent, otherwise they are dependent. The independence 
relation I identifies when it is possible to commute adjacent occurrences of operations 
in an execution sequence. It is used to define an equivalence relation on interleaving 
sequences. First, equivalence between finite strings of operations is defined [22]: 
Definition 6.1. Two strings v, WET* are equivalent, denoted v--w, iff there exists 
a sequence of strings uo, ul, . . . , u,, where u. = v, u, = w, and for each 0 < i < n, Ui = iic@ 
and Ui+l= @ctti for some U, GET*, (c(, /J)EZ. 
That is, w is equivalent o v if it can be obtained from it by repeatedly commuting 
independent operations. This definition of an equivalence relation among finite 
strings is now extended to interleaving sequences. Let Pref(w) be the set of finite 
prefixes. In order to allow stuttering as before, we define Pref(w) to be closed under 
inserting or removing any finite number of no_op symbols. Thus, e.g. 
c( no_op no_op /3EPref(c@y). 
of the (finite or infinite) string w. Let r_ be a relation between pairs of interleaving 
sequences: (s, 2;) 2 (s’, v’) iff 
l s=s’, and 
l Vu~~ref(v)3w~Pref(o’)3zET*(w~z A uEPref(z)). 
That is, the two interleaving sequences have the same initial state, and each finite 
prefix of v is a prefix of some permutation of a prefix of v’. Let 0 z C’ iff CJ r 0’ and 
0’ 5 0 [14]. Then clearly cz is an equivalence relation between interleaving sequences. 
The following definition gives an alternative interpretation of LTL formulas over 
equivalence classes of interleaving sequences, rather than over all the execution 
sequences of the program. 
Definition 6.2. An LTL formula cp is existentially satisfied [23] by a class of sequences 
2 if there exists a sequence in this class that satisfies it (according to the usual 
definition of the satisfaction of temporal formula w.r.t. an interleaving sequence). This 
is denoted as C p cp. 
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The existential satisfaction relation is weaker than the ordinary satisfaction relation 
of temporal logic formulas over sequences, because it demands only that representa- 
tives of the interleaving sequences satisfy one formula rather than all of them. 
6.2. Behavior of distributed recover): algorithm 
Algorithms for recovering to a previous checkpoint (snapshot), such as [13], or 
those based on the snapshot algorithm of Chandy and Lamport [S], have the 
following properties: 
l The snapshot or checkpoint to which the program recovers does not necessarily 
occur in the same interleaving sequence in which the fault occurred. However, if one 
considers the set of equivalent execution sequences (up to permuting adjacent 
independent operations), the state to which the algorithm recovers appears in one 
of the equivalent sequences. 
l Recovery does not have to be done simultaneously by all the processes. A process 
may start execution from its saved local state before another process senses the 
fault. However, in each equivalence class of execution sequences, there is a sequence 
in which the processes start recovering simultaneously, i.e. from the same state. 
It is easy to describe the behavior of the combined fault-tolerant program by means of 
representative sequences. For each equivalence class of sequences, there is a sequence 
which always recovers to the most recent global snapshot saved, and this global state is 
a state that occurred in this sequence. This can be specified using existential satisfaction 
of LTL formulas. In fact, an appropriate transformation could be similar or even 
identical to 9((p) (or &(cp)) in Section 4.1. However, 9((p) should now be interpreted 
existentially, i.e. satisfied by at least one sequence out of each equivalence classes of 
sequences, rather than universally as before. That is, if PI= cp, then F(P)p P(q). 
This means that we obtain a transformation from a universally quantified formula 
into the weaker form of an existentially quantified formula. However, such a formula 
cp is also a specification of all the possible interleaving sequences in the sense that it 
requires each of the program’s interleaving sequences to be equivalent to a sequence that 
satisfies cp. Thus, we need to supply the means to deduce universally satisfied properties 
from the existential formula. That is, a verification method is needed, that allows to 
deduce from Pp-cp that P + I/I, for appropriate existential and universal properties 
cp and II/, respectively. This ability has been demonstrated elsewhere [23], where it is 
shown that by using appropriate definitions, enough information about all the equiva- 
lent sequences can be obtained from the representative sequences. This guarantees that 
compositional completeness is also achievable in this generalized case as well. 
7. Discussion and further research 
A specification method was presented to handle the superposition of generic 
recovery algorithms on basic programs designed to be executed on fault-free systems. 
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This produces a program that is fault tolerant with respect o the failures that can be 
handled by the recovery algorithm. Rather than specifying the recovery algorithm 
separately, we have suggested a method by which it is specified as a specification 
transformation from the properties of basic programs to the properties of the super- 
posed fault tolerant version. The properties of the recovery algorithm itself appear 
only as a fixed part of any application of this transformation on a formula. 
This method is compositional, as verification is done with respect to the basic 
program and using the transformation. There is no further need to reason about, or 
even to denote, the version of the program after the superposition. A relatively 
complete verification method was given to prove that a transformation correctly 
corresponds to a superposition. Hence, a specification transformation is proved once 
for all possible basic programs to which the recovery algorithms can be applied. 
Using the framework described in this paper, it is possible to achieve other benefits. 
One of these is the classification and comparison of different schemes for distributed 
recovery: various schemes have advantages and disadvantages with respect to the 
properties that hold after superposition of the recovery algorithm. 
Another comparison is of the amount of work needed to be done for achieving 
recovery. An extreme case could be that recovery is achieved by rolling back to the 
very first state. Other methods can vary in the complexity of the recovery algorithm 
and the amount of computation lost/redone. 
The effect of fairness on program and specification transformations is a tantalizing 
issue which demands a careful study. For example, an operation which is enabled 
continuously in an execution of the basic program and thus needs to be executed 
eventually, might not retain these properties in the transformed program: it can 
happen that the enabledness i interrupted by repeated occurrence of faults that will 
disable it infinitely often for short periods. Thus, it is crucial to consider carefully the 
fairness assumptions under which a formula corresponds to a given program trans- 
formation. 
Probabilistic specification can be used to allow using algorithms that achieve fault 
tolerance “almost always”. Another possibility is to give a precise probabilistic 
characterization of the computation as a function of the probability of faults. This is 
a generalization of the transformation of the basic program’s properties. Temporal 
logics that incorporate probabilistic reasoning can be used [26]. 
Appendix: linear temporal logic 
Definition A.1 An LTL structure & is a triple (Q, &5) where Q is a set of states, C$ is 
some distinguished state of Q and ( is a sequence of states from Q, (,,<1<2r . . . , starting 
with to =G. The labeling function L assigns to each state qEQ an interpretation over 
theflexible variables, and for each rigid variable an interpretation that is fixed over all 
states. Let L(q) be the interpretation of both the flexible and the rigid variables in the 
state q. 
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Definition A.2 (Syntax of LTL). If Yis the set of formulas in LTL then 
l for each classical formula 43, (PE Y: 
l if cperthen q cp, O(p,lcp~X 
l ifcp,~Erthencpr\~,cpv~,cpU~,cp~~~E1: 
l if (PE Yand z is a variable, then 3z cp, Vz (PE YI 
Definition A.3 (Semantics of LTL). The satisfaction of an LTL formula over a se- 
quence 5, position 0 d i < I(] and labeling function L is defined inductively: 
. 6% 5, i)l= T 
0 (L, 5, i)l=(p 0 L(<i)+q, if qn is a state formula. 
l (L,&i)l=cn v II/ 0 (L,4,+9 or (L,4,+$. 
l (L,i”,i)l=icp *not (L,5,i)l=cp. 
l (L, 5, i)l= (cp%!$) o there exists i 6 j < (<I such that (L, <,j)+ $, and for every k, 
such that i< k <j, (L, 4, k)J= cp. 
l (L, 5, i)\= 3zq1 o there exists a labeling function L^, which differs from L by at most 
the assignment given to z, and (i, t, i)[= cp. 
Each interleaving sequence 5 of a program P can be seen as an LTL structure, with 
a set of states S (the state space of the program) and a labeling function L that agrees 
with the assignment of variables to their domain in each state of 5. Thus, we define 
4 (= cp iff (L, r, O)+ cp. The satisfaction of a formula is extended to a set of interleaving 
sequences E such that El= cp iff for each <EE, < + cp. 
The other operations such as q cp, Vz cp can be defined similarly. They satisfy the 
followingrelations:F=~T,cp~~=~((1cp)v(~~)),cp-,~=(~cp)v~,~~~= 
(cp-‘Ic/) A ($-cp), Ocp=@@a9), q cp=i(true%(icp)), cpU$=(cp%~/~)v 09, 
vycp=131cp. 
The modal ((q>> from Section 5.1 is now defined formally: (L, 4, i)l= ((q))cp iff the 
sequence 0, which is obtained from 4 by omitting the states c(j) in which either j < i or 
(L, 5, j) k q holds,4 satisfies either 
(1) 5’ is infinite and (L, <‘,O)/=cp, or 
(2) 4’ is finite, and there exists an infinite sequence [, and an appropriate extension 
L’ of L to the new states in f, such that (L’,<‘[,O)+cp (where <I,[ denotes the 
concatenation of the sequences 4’ and [). 
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‘i.e., there exists a partial monotonic surjective mapping A from the positive integers 2’ onto Z+ , or 
some prefix of Z+, in which i is in the domain of A if i>j and (L, 5, i)\=q, and the relation between 5 and 5’ is 
[‘(il(i))=c(i). 
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